DeVillier v Texas – Owner Entitled to Just Compensation in State Court Proceeding

Here’s the short story. Texas Dep’t of Transportation modified a highway adjacent to private property to act as flood protection for property south of the highway.  But, every time it rained post-construction, the Property owner north of the highway was flooded as depicted on the image from the Court’s opinion above (right side of photo).

“DeVillier filed suit in Texas state court. He alleged that, by building the median barrier and using his property to store stormwater, Texas had effected a taking of his property. DeVillier argued that he was therefore entitled to just compensation under both the United States and Texas Constitutions. Other property owners filed similar suits. Texas removed the cases to federal court, where they were consolidated into a single proceeding with one operative complaint. The operative complaint includes inverse condemnation claims under both the Texas Constitution and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 186 (2019) (“Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As relevant, Texas moved to dismiss the federal inverse condemnation claim, arguing that a plaintiff has no cause of action arising directly under the Takings Clause. It contended that only Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, provides a vehicle to assert constitutional violations, and §1983 does not authorize claims against a State. DeVillier did not dispute that he intended to bring his federal claim directly under the Fifth Amendment. Instead, he responded that the Takings Clause is “self-executing,” which, he argued, means that the Clause itself provides a cause of action for just compensation.” Slip op at 3-4.

The Supreme Court issued its unanimous opinion on April 16, 2024. DeVillier v Texas 4-19-24. “Texas does not dispute the nature of the substantive right to just compensation. This case presents only a question regarding the procedural vehicle by which a property owner may seek to vindicate that right.”

If that’s the only question to be decided, why is it before the United States Supreme Court?  And, when one reads the following paragraphs from the Court’s opinion, the question resonates.

“Our precedents do not cleanly answer the question whether a plaintiff has a cause of action arising directly under the Takings Clause. But, this case does not require us to resolve that question. The question presented asks what would happen if a property owner had no cause of action to vindicate his rights under the Takings Clause. It would be imprudent to decide that question without satisfying ourselves of the premise that there is no cause of action. Our constitutional system assigns to state officers “a coordinate responsibility to enforce [the Constitution] according to their regular modes of procedure.” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 367 (1990).  It therefore looks to “[t]he good faith of the States [to] provid[e] an important assurance that ‘this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Law of the Land.’” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 755 (1999). We should not “assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution,” including the Takings Clause, because “States and their officers are [also] bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution.”  Slip op. at 6.

” This case therefore does not present the circumstance in which a property owner has no cause of action to seek just compensation. On remand, DeVillier and the other property owners should be permitted to pursue their claims under the Takings Clause through the cause of action available under Texas law.” Slip op. at 9.

I hope that the property owners are entitled to interest from the date of commencement of the action in addition to just compensation, damages, and attorneys’ fees.  Otherwise, they will not be indemnified for their loss and will be force to bear the burden of a loss that the public is supposed to bear.