Hot Off the Press: North Carolina Supreme Court Clarifies “Map Act” Takings

Back in 2015, Joseph Grather, Esq. from our firm blogged about the North Carolina Supreme Court’s precedent-setting “Map Act” decision in Kirby v. NCDOT. A decade later, Map Act takings are still being litigated in North Carolina courts, with two new Supreme Court decisions being issued in early December 2025. Keep reading for an overview of each holding.

Background

North Carolina’s Transportation/Roadway Corridor Official Map Act (“Map Act”) was enacted in 1987 and repealed by the legislature in 2019. The Map Act allowed the NCDOT to record highway corridor maps, imposing indefinite restrictions on private property within those corridors. Many of these restrictions limited a property owner’s right to improve, develop, and subdivide their private property. The North Carolina General Assembly eventually rescinded all Map Act corridors on July 11, 2016 in response to the state Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, 368 N.C. 847 (2016), which held that Map Act restrictions constituted takings by eminent domain requiring just compensation.

Mata v. NCDOT

The N.C. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mata v. NCDOT addressed two legal issues that were not answered in Kirby: (1) how to characterize the nature of the taking when the restrictions were later rescinded, and (2) the correct measure of damages for such takings.

On August 6, 1996, the NCDOT recorded a corridor map covering approximately 9.93 acres of land owned by plaintiffs Elizabeth A. Mata and The Mata Family, LLC (collectively, Matas). These restrictions remained in place for nearly twenty years until the General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors in 2016. The Matas filed an inverse condemnation action in 2019 seeking compensation for the twenty-year taking. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the proper measure of damages was fair rental value, the measure of damages for a temporary taking. The Court of Appeals agreed that the 2016 legislative rescission retroactively transformed what Kirby, and Chappell v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, 374 N.C. 273 (2020), characterized as an “indefinite” taking into a “temporary” taking, but reversed the trial court’s damages determination, directing instead that damages be calculated as “the diminution in value . . . until 11 July 2016.” Mata v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 294 N.C. App. 705, 713 (2024).

The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and held that “that Map Act corridor recordings effectuate indefinite takings of fundamental property rights at the moment of recording, and subsequent legislative rescission does not retroactively transform an indefinite taking into a temporary one for purposes of calculating just compensation.” Slip. op. at 2. Moreover, relying on its holding in Chappell, the Court clarified that the proper measure of damages for a Map Act taking is the “difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the corridor map recording, considering all pertinent factors including the indefinite nature of the restrictions and any effect of reduced ad valorem taxes.” Id. at 3. This analysis can incorporate “rental value considerations.”

Sanders v. NCDOT

In Sanders, the Court confronted a different legal issue: Whether a property owner abandons their right to seek just compensation for a Map Act taking by failing to raise the claim in a prior condemnation action instituted by NCDOT affecting the same property.

Mr. Sanders owned nearly 650 acres in Cumberland County, North Carolina. Corridor maps recorded in 1992 and 2006 encumbered portions of his land. NCDOT later initiated two direct condemnation actions (2002 and 2010), acquiring significant portions of Sanders’ property. Although both actions resulted in consent judgments, neither addressed compensation for the Map Act takings. After the maps were rescinded by the General Assembly in 2016, Mr. Sanders filed an inverse condemnation claim in 2018 and sought just compensation for the takings.

The trial court and Court of Appeals both concluded that Mr. Sanders could maintain a portion of his Map Act claims.

The N.C. Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the lower courts. The Court began it analysis by looking at the statute books. If a property owner disagrees with NCDOT’s estimate of just compensation, it may file an answer to the complaint pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 136-106. Thereafter, “[t]he owner has twelve months after being served with the complaint and declaration to file such an answer. N.C.G.S. § 136-107. The owner’s failure to file an answer within twelve months of service ‘shall constitute an admission that the amount deposited is just compensation and shall be a waiver of any further proceeding to determine just compensation.’ Id.” Slip op. at 13. In Sanders, the Court found that the Map Act claims were “pertinent” to the 2010 direction action and “N.C.G.S. § 136-106 required plaintiff to include them in a timely answer if he wanted them to be part of the damages calculation.” The Court relied heavily on the undisputed fact that the Map Act restrictions predated the 2010 condemnation action.

What About New Jersey’s Map Act?

Although New Jersey has its own Map Act, N.J.S.A. 27:7-66, our Appellate Division has held that the filing/recording of a highway alignment map, by itself, is not a taking. Rather, the restriction only amounts to a compensable taking when it results in “a substantial destruction of the beneficial use” of the property. See Schnack v. State, Dept. of Transp., 160 N.J. Super. 343 (App. Div. 1978). Thus, New Jerseyans should not expect an appellate decision that tracks the reasoning of the North Carolina Supreme Court any time soon.

Similar to the procedure in North Carolina, New Jersey property owners get “one bite at the apple” to make a claim for just compensation. All foreseeable and quantifiable damages, present and prospective, which affect a property because of the taking must be alleged during the condemnation proceedings. There cannot be successive proceedings. State Highway Comm’r v. Nat’l Fireproofing Corp., 127 N.J.L. 346 (E. & A. 1941). As such, it is vital for an owner’s response to a condemnation case to consider any encumbrances or restrictions that were on the property at the time of the taking.

For over 55 years, McKirdy, Riskin, Olson & DellaPelle, P.C. has concentrated its practice in this special area of the law and has earned a reputation for persistently defending its clients’ constitutionally-recognized property rights. If you are confronted with the threat of eminent domain, please feel free to contact us for a free consultation.