NJ Supreme Court Adds Two Redevelopment Related Cases to Docket
The first case is In re: Petition for Referendum to Repeal Ordinance 2354-12 of the Tp. of West Orange. The certified question: “Was plaintiffs’ action challenging the municipal redevelopment ordinance time barred and, if not, was the ordinance invalid because of the municipality’s failure to submit an application for approval of the issuance of bonds to the Local Finance Board in the Department of Community Affairs?”
The appellate division issued its Per Curiam opinion July 23, 2013, affirming the trial court’s determination that the suit was barred for two reasons: 1) the suit was not timely filed; and 2) the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law expressly exempted redevelopment ordinances from referendum (N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-28).
The second case is Grabowsky v. Tp. of Montclair, and the certified question: “Were these municipal officials disqualified from voting on this redevelopment ordinance because of their membership in a church located on property that is next to the site to be redeveloped?”
On this issue, the Appellate Division found that there was no conflict of interest sufficient to invalidate the municipal ordinance adopting an amended redevelopment plan as a matter of law:
“The critical and undisputed fact, ignored by plaintiff, is that the Church was neither an applicant nor an objector in the matter under review. Indeed, it took no position on the matter at all. The facts here plainly fall outside the general rule that “[w]here a board member is a member of a church or other organization which is either an applicant or objector, the member must be disqualified[,]” Cox & Koenig, Current N.J. Zoning & Land Use Administration 67 (emphasis added).
Although plaintiff has argued that the Church will benefit from the redevelopment project because, e.g., there are “obvious financial benefits to the Unitarian Church in having immobile, elderly neighbors next door,” we agree with the trial court that such interests are far too speculative for consideration in determining whether Fried and Lewis had a disqualifying conflict of interest. Similarly, we agree that Fried’s comment that his elderly mother could potentially reside in the facility fails to show that Fried pre-judged the issue, requiring his disqualification. See Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 45 N.J. 268, 282-83, 212 A.2d 153 (1965). We therefore conclude that the alleged conflict of interest does not provide a ground for the invalidation of the Ordinance as a matter of law.” [Slip op. at 10-11].
It will be interesting to see where the Supreme Court goes with these two cases.
